When the lights went out: Germany’s race to master the night sky
During the First World War, aerial combat at night was limited and poorly understood. After 1918, it remained a low priority. When Germany began secretly rebuilding its air force in the interwar period, the nascent Luftwaffe focused almost entirely on tactical, offensive operations in support of fast-moving ground forces—Nachtjagd (night-fighting) was not part of the plan.
The Luftwaffe’s general staff was not entirely unaware of the threat. The Condor Legion had flown night bombing raids in Spain with Ju 52s, losing at least two aircraft to Republican fighters. However, German planners failed to anticipate that Britain was quietly building a strategic bomber force. Following the collapse of the Geneva disarmament conference in 1934, Britain identified Germany as a major threat and, in line with the doctrines of theorist Giulio Douhet and RAF Marshal Hugh Trenchard, invested in long-range bombers as the primary means of striking at the continent.
The first RAF bombing raids on Germany came in response to the invasion of the Low Countries. On the night of May 15/16, 1940, 81 bombers struck the Ruhr. Berlin was bombed for the first time on the night of August 25/26, 1940.
Early night defense
Germany’s night defenses existed, but barely. On May 1, 1939, a dedicated night-fighting Staffel—10. (N)/JG 2—was formed at Döberitz with obsolete Arado Ar 68s and a few Bf 109 Ds, later moving to Jever. A second unit, 10.(N)/JG 72, existed briefly. Following the invasion of Poland, a third unit, 10.(N)/JG 26, was formed at Bonn-Hangelar under Oblt. Johannes Steinhoff and deployed to defend the Bay of Germany.
These early units operated primarily by day. On December 18, 1939, 10.(N)/JG 26 was credited with six Wellington bombers during a major air battle over north German ports—losses severe enough to push RAF Bomber Command toward night operations. By February 1940, the unit was redesignated 11.(N)/JG 2 and expanded into V.(N)/JG 2 under Hptm. Albert Blumensaat.
The first confirmed night victory of the war came on April 25/26, 1940, when Ofw. Hermann Förster of 11./JG 2 shot down a Hampden of 49 Squadron over Scandinavia—a direct result of Operation Weserübung, the German invasion of Norway and Denmark.
Falck’s experiment
The raids over Scandinavia particularly irritated Hptm. Wolfgang Falck, then commanding I./ZG 1 at Aalborg, whose airfield was being regularly bombed at night with little effective response from the Flak defenses. Falck decided to act. A nearby Freya radar station, operated by Lt. Werner Bode, could track incoming and departing RAF bombers with enough precision to predict their arrival to the minute. This gave Falck an idea.
“I started to get annoyed with the British. If they could fly at night — why couldn’t we? After all, we were also equipped with twin-engine aeroplanes and most of my pilots had been trained to fly on instruments.”
Falck proposed a coordinated network of radar, searchlights, Flak, and Bf 110s covering North Jutland and the surrounding sea lanes. His fighters would head out over the North Sea once radar detected enemy aircraft, waiting beyond the range of friendly fire until the bombers were close enough to engage visually—aided, even on dark nights, by the glow of exhaust flames.
He selected three experienced blind-flying pilots—Oblt. Werner Streib, Hptm. Günther Radusch and Ofw. Their—to test the concept. Streib was skeptical; the other three were not.
The first real test came on the night of April 30/May 1, when RAF bombers again struck Aalborg. In a chaotic, unplanned response, Falck and his pilots scrambled without helmets or radio contact, took off in the dark, and pursued the bombers westward. Falck found a target and fired but lost it in the morning haze. Radusch closed so near to a bomber that he drew return fire. Thier made three firing passes on a third aircraft, all unsuccessful. Streib saw nothing.
“There was basically something to our experiments, but we were still doing too much wrong.”
The lessons were taken seriously. Flame dampers were fitted to the Bf 110s’ Daimler-Benz engines to eliminate the blinding exhaust glow. Low-flash ammunition was adopted. Blind-flying instruments were improved. Coordination procedures with Flak, searchlight, and radar units were refined. Falck compiled a detailed report and forwarded it to the Reich Aviation Ministry, where it reached Göring’s desk and was well received.
The formation of NJG 1
On May 10, 1940, Germany launched its assault on the West. RAF Bomber Command responded with nightly raids by Wellingtons, Hampdens, and Whitleys over German industrial targets. The raids had a limited material effect but prompted the Luftwaffe to act on Falck’s blueprint. On June 22, 1940, as the Western Campaign ended, the now-promoted Maj. Falck was appointed Kommodore of a newly created Nachtjagdgeschwader 1 (NJG 1).
The Geschwader was assembled quickly from existing units. I./NJG 1, under Hptm. Walter Radusch was essentially I./ZG 1 renamed, equipped with Bf 110s, and based at Münchengladbach. II./NJG 1, under Hptm. Conrad von Bothmer comprised Bf 109s from IV./JG 2 at Amsterdam-Schiphol. A series of rapid reorganizations through July brought the unit to full strength, and by mid-summer the Geschwader was deployed as follows:
- Stab/NJG 1: Deelen (Bf 110)
- I./NJG 1: Gütersloh (Bf 110/Do 17)
- II./NJG 1: Düsseldorf (Ju 88)
- III./NJG 1: Düsseldorf (Bf 109 E)
In August, III./NJG 1 progressively replaced its Bf 109s with Bf 110s. By October, the remaining Bf 109s were transferred to Vlissingen to reinforce Jagdstaffel Holland.
First victories
The unit’s first confirmed night victory came on July 8/9, when Ofw. Hermann Förster of 5./NJG 1 shot down a Whitley of 10 Squadron. On July 19/20, Oblt. Werner Streib—now Staffelkapitän of 2./NJG 1—downed a Whitley of 51 Squadron near Ibbenbüren, the first night kill credited to a Bf 110. Further victories followed rapidly through late July and August.
The prevailing tactic at this stage was Helle Nachtjagd (illuminated night-fighting), in which searchlight batteries “coned” incoming RAF bombers, guiding night fighters to visual contact. Flak guns held their fire as the Nachtjäger approached. The system was effective when it worked, but bombers frequently escaped the beams and disappeared into darkness. All Luftwaffe night fighters were painted black during this period—a practice that continued until around 1943, when it became apparent that black aircraft were equally visible against illuminated clouds or a light sky.
Long-range night hunting: I./NJG 2
On September 1, 1940, II./NJG 1 was detached to become I./NJG 2, a specialized unit assigned to Fernnachtjagd—long-range night-hunting sorties over England. The concept, devised by Kammhuber, aimed to destroy RAF bombers at their home airfields:
“When I have to destroy a wasps’ nest, I don’t attack the wasps one by one but wait until they have all returned to the nest to smoke them out.”
The Gruppe, based initially at Schiphol and later Gilze-Rijen, was equipped with a mixed complement of Ju 88 C-2s, Do 17 Z-7s, and Z-10s. Its three Staffeln were commanded by experienced officers drawn from Zerstörer and bomber backgrounds. A fourth Staffel was added to support the unit’s particularly hazardous operations.
To replace II./NJG 1, NJG 1 absorbed I./ZG 76—a Zerstörer unit with combat experience in Poland and Scandinavia. Its pilot roster included Lt. Helmut Lent, already credited with seven daytime kills.
I./NJG 2’s operations over England produced ambiguous results from the outset. Several claimed kills in September could not be verified. On September 16, the Gruppe suffered its first confirmed loss when a Ju 88 of 3./NJG 2 was brought down by anti-aircraft fire over the sea. With no radar guidance, operating against increasingly capable British night defenses—including the new Bristol Beaufighter—the strategic value of Fernnachtjagd was already in question.
Expansion and growing pains
On October 1, Falck received the Ritterkreuz in recognition of his work establishing NJG 1. The same day, Maj. Streib—credited with multiple night victories—was also awarded the Ritterkreuz and appointed to command I./NJG 1 following Radusch’s transfer to lead the newly formed I./NJG 3 at Vechta. On October 6, Kommandeur von Stillfried und Rattonitz of II./NJG 1 was killed after an engine fire; command passed to Maj. Walter Ehle the following day.
November and December saw a sharp reduction in activity due to winter weather. NJG 1 recorded only one confirmed victory in November—the first for a future ace, Oblt. Egmont Prinz zur Lippe-Weissenfeld—and another single kill in December. I./NJG 2 fared worse, claiming a handful of uncertain victories while losing multiple crews, including Kommandeur Hptm. Heyse. Command passed to Hptm. Kurt Hülshoff. On November 1, Hptm. von Bothmer, previously relieved of command for disciplinary reasons, took his own life.
End-of-year assessment
By the close of 1940, the Luftwaffe’s night-fighting arm had established its foundations but remained limited in capability. NJG 1, under competent leadership, was developing practical experience with Helle Nachtjagd and awaiting improved detection and guidance technology. I./NJG 2’s long-range intruder operations had proven costly and largely inconclusive against a strengthening British defense. I./NJG 3 was still forming.
The fundamental infrastructure—radar networks, ground control, specialized aircraft, and trained crews—was still being built. The real expansion of the Nachtjagd, and its transformation into a formidable defensive force, lay ahead.
This article is from the book “Night Fighter Aces of the Luftwaffe 1940–43” by Neil Page and Jean-Louis Roba, available here.
