How Egyptian pilots stumbled upon Dimona and the secret development of Israel’s nuclear arsenal
While Egypt launched a nuclear program in 1954 and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Israel never signed the treaty. For over 50 years, Israeli policy has maintained “deliberate nuclear ambiguity,” with officials stating the country would “not be the one to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East.” Evidence suggests otherwise. Technician Mordechai Vanunu’s 1986 revelations from the Negev Nuclear Research Centre confirmed Israel possessed dozens of nuclear weapons.
The accidental discovery
In October 1965, two Egyptian MiG-17Fs violated Israeli airspace over the western Negev Desert. Lieutenant Salah Mansour led his wingman east across sandy terrain until they spotted a massive concrete tower near Jerocham. Startled, both pilots immediately returned to El-Arish air base.
Commander Tahsin Zaki recalled permitting occasional low-level flights into Israel to boost pilot morale after frequent Israeli penetrations of Egyptian airspace. Following Mansour’s report of suspicious construction, Zaki flew to confirm the sighting: “This time there was no doubt about it: a nuclear reactor was under construction.”
Despite President Nasser’s 1960 pledge of “preventive war” to stop Israeli nuclear development, Cairo took no action. Egyptian intelligence services focused primarily on preventing coups against Nasser’s government, likely missing the strategic significance.
Franco-Israeli cooperation
Israel’s nuclear ambitions began almost immediately after statehood. The Israeli Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1949, just one year after independence. Many eminent physicists from Berlin, Bucharest, Prague, and Warsaw had fled to Palestine, bringing crucial scientific expertise.
In early 1957, Israel and France secretly agreed to construct a 26 MW reactor and an underground plutonium separation plant at Dimona. Israeli scientists gained unrestricted access to French nuclear test data from Algeria. Paris had become frustrated with the US-British “special relations” in nuclear development.
When the CIA discovered Dimona’s true nature in 1960, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion assured President Eisenhower it was a “textile factory.” After the State Department publicly disclosed intelligence findings, Israel admitted to reactor construction. French President Charles de Gaulle then canceled nuclear cooperation unless Dimona opened to international inspections and produced no reprocessed plutonium.
Ben-Gurion promised to stop weapons development. Despite de Gaulle’s distrust, France agreed to fulfill the contract minus the plutonium separation plant. In 1964, Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres secured a new agreement allowing French companies to continue work while Israel declared the project “peaceful”—a declaration never issued.
Israel obtained uranium from a French company in Gabon and acquired up to 206 pounds of weapons-grade enriched uranium through US companies NUMEC and ISORAD. This enabled the final construction of nuclear bombs. The Negev Nuclear Research Centre (KAMAG) and Weapons Development Authority (RAFAEL) merged under the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission in November 1965.
May 1967 crisis
On May 17, 1967, Egyptian aircraft from the Meliz air base flew over Dimona at altitudes exceeding 18,000 meters. HAWK surface-to-air missiles failed to intercept—the aircraft flew above engagement range. Combined with reports of Egyptian bomber deployments, the incident put Israeli forces on full alert.
Recent scholarly speculation suggested Soviet MiG-25R reconnaissance aircraft conducted these overflights to prepare for intervention. However, the MiG-25R existed only as a prototype in 1967 and didn’t deploy operationally until 1971. The aircraft were actually Egyptian-piloted MiG-21F-13s from No. 45 Squadron.
Pilot Qadri Abd el-Hamid recalled, “We were flying over Israeli territory but stayed over it just a short time, so the (Dassault) Mirage (IIICJ interceptors) couldn’t reach us. On 29 May 1967, we had seen Eshkol [on TV] with President [Lyndon B] Johnson in the USA. He was begging for US support because the Egyptians were flying over them every day, and they could not stop us.”
By May 28, Israeli teams had assembled the first two or three improvised nuclear bombs. Contingency plan “Shimshon” (Samson) envisaged demonstrative deployment of a nuclear device by helicopter in eastern Sinai as a last resort if Israel faced peril.
On June 5, Israeli forces launched devastating preemptive strikes against Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi air bases, claiming destruction of 374 aircraft while losing 19. By June 10, Israel controlled the Golan Heights, West Bank, Gaza, and Sinai Peninsula, establishing military hegemony over the Middle East.
The Jericho missile
Israel likely initiated carrier development as early as 1946-1952 by hiring leading US rocket engineer John Whiteside “Jack” Parsons. Confirmed efforts began when Israel contracted the French company Dassault for surface-to-surface missile development capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
The MD.620 missile measured 13.4 meters long, weighed 6.7 tonnes, and could carry a 750 kg warhead over 500 kilometers. It achieved speeds of Mach 6, ascending to 150 km altitude before re-entering at Mach 8, with a circular error probability of just 300 meters. Testing began in 1965, with the first successful full-system test on March 16, 1966.
By January 1969, France imposed a total arms embargo, but ten missiles had been delivered. Entering service as the YA-1 Jericho with No. 150 Squadron at Sdot Micha, US intelligence reported Israel received 12 missiles from France and planned production of 24-30 total, “ten of which were programmed for nuclear warheads.”
Warhead production began in 1968, reaching three devices annually by 1973. When a US military attaché “got close to” the Jericho, Israel declared him persona non grata. By October 1973, US intelligence estimated Israel possessed 14 20-kiloton warheads (450 kg each) and six 50-kiloton warheads (700 kg each), with six more under assembly. Between 10 and 13 Jerichos served under the code name “David’s Arrow.”
Air-delivered weapons
After acquiring 44 F-4E Phantom II fighter-bombers—delivery of which President Johnson attempted to condition on NPT signing, Vietnam War support, and Middle East peace flexibility—Israel began nuclear compatibility modifications. Johnson received no concessions.
Rockwell Corporation’s involvement from 1968-1969 helped establish Israeli Aircraft Industries and arranged the clandestine delivery of 50 French-embargoed Mirage 5s in 1970. By October 1973, the Israeli Air Force had “10 F-4Es based at Tel Nov AB” equipped to carry nuclear weapons under the reported code name “David’s Shield.”
Strategic purpose
The standard explanation for Israeli nuclear development cites a small country surrounded by hostile neighbors sworn to destruction. However, professional military assessments from 1947 onward consistently concluded that Jewish and later Israeli forces maintained military superiority over all neighbors combined.
During the 1960 negotiations, Ben-Gurion told de Gaulle that Egyptian MiG-19s could destroy Tel Aviv, Haifa, and four aerodromes “in one hour,” killing most Israeli-born Jews and European immigrants “who form the core of our nation,” while “immigrants coming from backward and undereducated countries are less relevant.” De Gaulle, unimpressed, replied that Egyptian forces could not destroy Israeli cities and that Israel could defend itself conventionally.
An Israeli expert explained in the early 1970s, “Acquiring a superior weapons system would mean the possibility of using it for compelling purposes—that is, forcing the other side to accept Israeli political demands.”
The Israeli Defence Force developed deployment doctrine with plans code-named “Situation Intensity,” “Samson Ended,” “Last Genius,” “Forced Resolution,” and “Bitter Freedom.” Options ranged from UN warnings to Arab governments, direct warnings to Cairo and Damascus, deployment against Egyptian military forces without warning, destruction of Arab capitals, or continued deployment of all available weapons until the war ended.
One intelligence assessment concluded, “Our assessment was that the Israelis were ready to make use of their nuclear weapons, and we had little doubt that they would use them, even if only as a last resort—for example, if Egyptian troops would break through in the Sinai, or Syrians reach the Jordan River.”
This article is from the book “1973: The First Nuclear War” by Tom Cooper and Abdallah Emran, available here.
